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This article examines the role the Moscow-Washington Hotline played in the 
1967 Six-Day War, focusing on the Soviet side. We argue that the Soviet Union 
used the Direct Communication Link much more broadly than had been 
intended when the Hotline was agreed on in 1963 mainly because Moscow did 
not assign the Hotline any special diplomatic significance. We also show that the 
Hotline is a poor channel for crisis negotiations, and its efficacy as a 
communication tool is compromised if regular diplomatic channels cannot 
match its speed. Finally, we challenge the existing debate in the historiography 
of the Six-Day War, arguing for the importance of studying the implications of 
Soviet behaviour rather than Soviet intentions. 
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Introduction 
Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin and US President Lyndon Johnson met in Glassboro, 
New Jersey, on 23-25 June 1967 – just two weeks after the Six-Day War, also known as 
the June War, ended in the defeat of the Soviet-supported Arab states. The June War 
had been the first occasion when Soviet and American leaders had taken advantage of 
the Direct Communication Link (DCL), also known as the MOLINK or Hotline, and its 
use became a recurring topic in their discussions in Glassboro.1 On one occasion, 
Johnson praised Kosygin for initiating communication through the MOLINK, claiming 
that, as a result, they had ‘managed to alleviate the situation’.2 Johnson’s statement, as 
well as the frequency with which Kosygin and Johnson mentioned their Hotline 
correspondence, is indicative of the fact that both leaders attached great importance to 
their instantaneous exchange of messages. 
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However, no scholarly studies to date have examined the role that the Hotline 
played in either the Six-Day War or any other crisis. Therefore, it is unclear whether or 
not Kosygin and Johnson’s appreciative references to the Hotline’s usefulness can be 
justified. To fill this gap, this article analyses the role the Washington-Moscow Hotline 
played in superpower communications in the Six-Day War. Given the fact that the 
Soviet Union initiated most Hotline exchanges, and in light of the continuing debate 
surrounding the Soviet Union’s role in the June 1967 crisis, this article focuses on the 
Soviet use of the Hotline.3 In our efforts to use records of Hotline exchanges to appraise 
Soviet conduct, we discuss the following issues: how Soviet use of the Hotline 
corresponded to the original purpose for which the line had been created; how it related 
to the traditionalist and revisionist understanding of Soviet behaviour in the 
historiography of the Six-Day War; and, finally, how its use fitted into the USSR’s 
overall diplomatic communication with the United States in the pre-war period (12 May 
-4 June 1967) and during the war (5-10 June 1967). 
The traditionalist understanding of Soviet intentions in the Six-Day War 
suggests that Soviet use was in harmony with the original intentions for which the 
MOLINK was created, as Soviet leaders worked to avert crisis escalation and war. This 
interpretation would support Kosygin and Johnson’s perception that the Hotline had 
been employed in order to diffuse tensions. Meanwhile the revisionist appraisal of the 
Soviet role in the June 1967 war as interventionist in nature suggests a contrary 
interpretation. We evaluate Soviet messages on a traditionalist-revisionist-interpretation 
scale, and show that some of the messages can clearly be classified as fitting with a 
traditionalist view, albeit with some revisionist elements, while in others elements 
predominated that fit with a revisionist view. On this basis, we argue that Soviet use of 
the Hotline points beyond a traditionalist understanding of the USSR’s role in the Six-
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Day War. We show that the Soviet leadership used the Hotline more creatively than the 
original purpose behind its creation would suggest, and viewed it as one of many tools – 
and not necessarily a unique one – in their diplomatic arsenal. We also show that, 
notwithstanding its many other advantages, the Hotline was and is a poor channel for 
crisis negotiations, and that its efficacy as a communication tool is compromised if 
regular diplomatic channels cannot match its speed.  
There are three reasons why findings regarding the role of the Hotline in crisis 
communication are applicable beyond the Cold War. First, relations between Russia and 
the West today are deteriorating, which could easily precipitate a crisis in which 
decision-makers would consider reverting to the Hotline. Because the current Russian 
leadership has a similar mentality to that of the Communist Russian leaders, and shares 
the latter’s visions for their country’s role in history,4 conclusions drawn from the Cold 
War period may hold useful lessons for dealing with Russia in the present. Second, the 
Hotline continued to be used after 1990 and remains a valued diplomatic instrument 
today.5 Finally, findings regarding the Hotline are likely to be applicable beyond the 
Soviet/Russian-American context – namely to the eight private and bilateral hotlines 
developed by other states during and since the Cold War.6 
The Origins and Purpose of the Moscow-Washington Hotline 
It was Professor Thomas Schelling and Jess Gorkin – the editor of Parade magazine – 
who, in 1958, first proposed to American government circles that there should be a 
direct communication link between the Soviet premier and the American president. In 
1960, Gorkin had the chance to raise the issue with both Soviet premier Nikita 
Khrushchev and presidential candidate John F. Kennedy. Both Kennedy and 
Khrushchev expressed interest, and following Kennedy’s election, Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk recommended that the President propose a direct telephone connection to 
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Khrushchev during the Vienna summit of June 1961. Although no suggestion was made 
at the summit, in July 1961 the Berlin crisis refocused attention on the idea in the State 
Department. After Khrushchev privately reaffirmed his interest, the United States 
formally proposed a leader-to-leader communication link in April 1962, and a draft 
treaty covering the link was submitted by the Soviet Union at the Geneva disarmament 
conference in June. However, negotiations stalled until after the Cuban Missile Crisis 
had proved the vital need for fast and reliable communications between the two heads of 
state. The United States officially tabled the Hotline proposal in December 1962, and 
the agreement, which established a teletype connection between Moscow and 
Washington, was signed in June 1963. Since then, several upgrade agreements have 
ensured the regular modernization of the Hotline. In 1971 a satellite circuit replaced the 
more vulnerable telegraph cables, and in 1984, the facility to send graphic images was 
added. More recently, email, chat and video transmission capabilities have also been 
added.7 
The Hotline was a device intended to reduce anxiety and, with it, the risk of 
triggering nuclear war in emergency situations, by making rapid and reliable leader-to-
leader communication possible. It would give leaders the opportunity to share 
information, signal urgency, communicate their intentions, propose joint action, engage 
in negotiations, clear up misunderstandings and explain unforeseen, and potentially 
fatal, events before a crisis could escalate into war. As a confidential channel, it would 
allow leaders to discuss their differences in private – away from the public eye and the 
need to produce inflammatory Cold War rhetoric. The direct involvement of principal 
decision-makers could facilitate the elimination of bureaucratic red tape and 
bureaucratically compromised outcomes. A written teletype link was chosen over the 
originally proposed telephone connection, because the latter could easily have increased 
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– rather than decreased – the risk of war through hasty decisions, emotional outbursts, 
awkwardly phrased statements and mistranslations. In contrast, teletype was judged to 
be a cooler medium that would give decision-makers more time to consider their 
response and the consequences of their words.8 However, as we show in this article, the 
velocity of transmission brought its own problems, because the DCL, in replacing more 
traditional diplomatic tools, precluded the spending of time on gathering the sort of 
valuable information that might have been forthcoming through these slower channels. 
Despite the popularity of the Hotline as a subject for online, print-magazine and 
newspaper stories,9 it has garnered much less attention from the academic community. 
Many studies that mention but are not directly concerned with the Hotline devote only a 
few pages to it,10 while the few studies that focus exclusively on it are either descriptive 
or prescriptive in nature.11 Only four articles take a somewhat more analytical approach, 
but even these fail to provide a focused inquiry into the Hotline’s use, as they either lack 
a well-defined research question,12 are short of evidence to support their conclusions,13 
or focus on the symbolism of the Hotline rather than its use.14 
The lack of analytical research may be explained, in part, by the fact that this is 
not an easy subject to research, with only the Hotline correspondence created during the 
Six-Day War being readily accessible to scholars. Just one study of the Six-Day War 
explicitly considers the role of Hotline messages; and this does so by drawing only on 
the 8 June exchanges about the sinking of the USS Liberty.15 Ginor and Remez explore 
the significance of Kosygin’s 5 June message; and Wehling discusses Kosygin’s first 
messages on both 5 and 10 June; but both are limited to the context of their research 
themes – Soviet intentions and value tensions, respectively.16 
6 
Interpretations of the Soviet Role in the Six-Day War 
Since its appearance as a major player in the Middle East in 1955, the Soviet Union had 
viewed the region within the framework of a global rivalry with the United States and 
had sought to challenge American dominance. It soon established a naval force in the 
Mediterranean and began supplying arms to its Arab allies – Egypt and Syria in 
particular. In the mid-1960s, the Soviet leadership worked to prevent Israel from 
building its own nuclear weapon, which was very close to completion in the spring of 
1967, and to ensure the security of its most precious ally, Syria.17 
It was the Soviet Union, on 12 May 1967, that provoked the acute crisis when 
the Politburo transmitted false information to Egypt about an Israeli troop build-up on 
the Syrian border and expected Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to ‘take the 
necessary steps’.18 On 14 May, Nasser evicted the UN’s troops from the Sinai Peninsula 
and replaced them with Egyptian forces. On 23 May, Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran 
and, by doing so, the Gulf of Aqaba – a move that Israel deemed an act of war.19 Israel 
started the war on 5 June and was the last to honour the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) cease-fire resolutions accepted on 6, 7, and 9 June. While the Israelis 
were quick to declare their acceptance of the cease-fire resolutions after their passage, 
they failed to comply with them until 10 June – after they had occupied the West Bank, 
the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai Peninsula. 
Soviet intentions and behaviour during the June crisis of 1967 are the subject of 
disagreement among the small number of scholars who explicitly study the role of the 
Soviet Union in the otherwise substantial literature on the Six-Day War.20 It is 
impossible to say who is right, as contradictions in Soviet behaviour provide partial 
(documentary) support for both traditionalist and revisionist accounts.21 Additionally, 
the treatment of sources and the conclusions drawn from them remain problematic 
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across the literature, and it is unclear whether any (re-)opening of Russian archives in 
the future could provide scholars with decisive documentary evidence.22 Such material 
may not exist;23 or, if available, it may be unreliable, since the Soviet leadership 
sometimes wrote documents with an eye toward the future or as ex post justification.24  
The literature explicitly dealing with the role of the Soviets in the Six-Day War 
is best conceptualised on a scale running between classical traditionalist and revisionist 
views. Traditionalists insist that the Soviet Union had peaceful intentions throughout the 
crisis,25 while revisionists argue that the Soviet Union’s original intention was to 
engineer an all-out confrontation and provide limited military support for the Arab 
states.26 Other views fall between these two extremes: some scholars support a mainly 
traditionalist argument for peaceful Soviet intentions, but note inconsistencies in Soviet 
behaviour, which they blame on the Soviets’ mistakes and miscalculations, or on 
reckless behaviour.27 The rest of the literature views Soviet behaviour in a more sinister 
light. These scholars contend that, while the Soviet Union did not want war, it 
intentionally created an international crisis to increase Soviet influence in the Arab 
world, and/or to create tension points around the world for the United States.28 
Similar disagreements surround the question of Soviet knowledge of, and 
support for, Egyptian actions (i.e., Egypt’s eviction of UN peacekeepers and the closure 
of the Straits) and the exact date when the Soviet Union actively started to work for 
peace. For instance, Ro’i and Morozov, and Govrin, and Popp argue that the Soviet 
Union had no prior knowledge of, and did not support, Egypt’s actions.29 Bar-Zohar and 
Oren, on the other hand, contend that the USSR supported the removal of UN 
peacekeepers but not the closing of the Straits.30 Finally, Ginor and Remez assert that 
the Soviets knew of, and supported, both Egyptian actions.31 Concerning Soviet 
intentions, the traditionalist view holds that the Soviet Union worked for peace from the 
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moment when the crisis erupted.32 Revisionists, however, whilst agreeing that the Soviet 
Union started to work for peace on 5 June, in order to prevent a superpower 
confrontation,33 contend that it did so only with reluctance, and that it rekindled plans 
for intervention after Israel started a ground war against Syria on 9 June.34 Other 
scholars assert that the Soviet Union first reaped the harvest of Nasser’s moves early in 
the crisis, and propose various dates in between as the starting point for Soviet peace 
efforts.35 
The debate concerning the locating of Soviet actions on the traditionalist-
revisionist-interpretation scale is important for this article, because each view leads to 
different expectations regarding the Hotline’s use. If, as traditionalists argue, the Soviet 
Union worked for peace throughout the crisis, we would expect that, at a minimum, the 
Soviet Union would have used all diplomatic channels of communication with the 
United States to lessen tensions from 28 May on. Thus, we would hypothesise that the 
Soviet leadership used the Hotline in accordance with its original purpose as an 
emergency crisis instrument, and treated it as a rare and precious channel through which 
urgent and constructive messages could be sent in order to prevent the further 
aggravation of tensions.  
Revisionist accounts lead us to anticipate just the opposite. That is, if the Soviet 
Union was working toward creating tension, we would expect that the Hotline either 
remained silent despite the threat of Soviet-American confrontation or was employed in 
a superficial manner. In other words, a revisionist perspective would hypothesise that 
during this period the use, or lack thereof, of the Hotline was contradictory to the 
purpose for which it was created. Hence our analysis, and the remainder of the 
discussion, focuses on Soviet Hotline messages and situates them at a point on the 
traditionalist-revisionist scale. By applying this focus, we should be able to answer the 
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key question of whether Soviet actions were in line with what is now a classically 
traditionalist view, supported a classically revisionist view, or fell somewhere in 
between. In the following section, we compare Soviet messages sent during the Six-Day 
War to the original conceptualisation of the Hotline’s purpose by analysing their 
content, tone, cordiality, and urgency. 
The Hotline and Superpower Relations in the Crisis of June 1967 
Six-Day War Correspondence via the Hotline  
The Six-Day War was the first of 11 known episodes during which either the Soviet or 
the American side resorted to the use of the Hotline during the Cold War. Premier 
Kosygin and President Johnson exchanged 19 messages between 5 June and 10 June 
1967. One additional message, which was the retransmission of a telegram from US 
Secretary of State Rusk to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, was sent via the 
Hotline on 5 June.36 The Soviets initiated the dialogue in all instances except the Liberty 
incident of 8 June. The correspondence entailed short messages, with none exceeding 
500 words. In general, the Soviet side was more economical with words, with the 
average length of their messages being 99 words (in Russian) as opposed to an average 
length of American messages of 167 words (in English). 
Very little is known about the origins of the Soviet messages. However, given 
the strongly collective nature of the Soviet leadership at the time, and the seriousness of 
the occasion, it can be safely assumed that most – perhaps all – of the messages were 
the product of Politburo deliberation. The fact that the Politburo, which was the highest 
decision-making body in the Soviet Union, was in session throughout the six days of the 
war also supports such a conclusion. Thus, while the style and length of American 
messages reflected Johnson’s energetic, verbose and outgoing personality, the Soviet 
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messages were less personal products, even if they fitted well with Premier Kosygin’s 
dour and pragmatic style.37 
The Hotline Remains Silent (12 May-4 June 1967) 
As revisionists would expect, the Hotline remained silent between 12 May and 4 June 
despite the continuing deterioration of the situation. Certainly, after 28 May, this silence 
did not indicate a lack of need for more direct communication between the superpowers 
to prevent war. However, it was consistent with the generally uncooperative Soviet 
behaviour of the period: the Soviet Union rejected every opportunity for negotiations,38 
and seemed only to work toward preventing the United States from intervening, rather 
than toward stopping the war.39 
During this period, only weak evidence, in the form of Soviet promises to 
uphold the peace, supports a traditionalist perspective. Only after Nasser’s decision to 
blockade the Straits of Tiran did Kosygin and Johnson exchange messages. However, 
their 27-28 May 1967 correspondence took place via regular diplomatic channels, and 
was no more constructive than lower-level diplomatic exchanges had already been. 
Soviet diplomatic behaviour, including Kosygin’s 27 May letter,40 was reactive in 
nature. The American – not the Soviet – side, both in Moscow and Washington, 
initiated the dialogue for peace (see table 1). The Soviet response was limited to 
assurances of peaceful Soviet intentions, as was the case on 18 May at a meeting 
between Soviet Chargé d’Affaires Yuri Chernyakov and US Undersecretary of State for 
Political Affairs Eugene Rostow in Washington,41 and at a luncheon between US 
Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in 
Moscow the next day.42 In the United Nations, Soviet Ambassador Nikolai Fedorenko 
belittled the seriousness of the Middle Eastern crisis by questioning whether there was 
any need for the UNSC to meet, and by stalling all efforts to lift the blockade.43 
11 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
As the crisis went on, Soviet behaviour overwhelmingly confirmed the 
revisionist view of the Hotline’s use. The Soviet responses, including Kosygin’s 27 May 
letter to Johnson, became more bellicose in tone – not more cooperative. On 23 May, 
Gromyko was uncooperative, simply repeating the Soviet commitment to peace, 
blaming Israel for the tense situation, implying American-Israeli collusion, and 
criticizing American timidity in restraining Israel.44 On 24 May, Embassy employee and 
KGB officer Boris Sedov threatened US Deputy Undersecretary of State Raymond 
Garthoff with Soviet entry into the action if the United States intervened militarily.45 
Kosygin’s 27 May letter fits this revisionist pattern, complicity in Israel’s actions and 
warning that Soviet restraint would not continue if the interests of the Arab states were 
seen to suffer.46 He also invoked the possibility of a war that might lead to a ‘larger 
event’.47 On 28 May, President Johnson’s plea to Kosygin for parallel action, and 
Secretary Rusk’s appeal to Gromyko for joint action, were not answered.48 Diplomatic 
channels between Moscow and Washington remained quiet until 5 June, despite the 
growing threat of war. Failing to make use of the Hotline in a swiftly deteriorating 
situation ran contrary to the original purpose behind the creation of this communication 
device and, thus, validated revisionist interpretations. 
Calculated First Use (5 June) 
The beginning of the war, at around 9:4549 on the morning of 5 June 1967, resulted in 
the intensification of Soviet-American communication at all levels (see table 1). Both 
superpowers appear to have decided independently to contact the other side early in the 
war, but it was the Kremlin that initiated dialogue through the DCL. Invoking the 
Hotline in a time of crisis was in harmony with the original intent behind the creation of 
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this communication channel as an emergency instrument, and thus confirms the 
traditionalist narrative. Nonetheless, we argue that the Soviets’ first use of the Hotline 
falls closer to the revisionist end of our scale because this usage lacked the urgency that 
an emergency situation should have required50 and did not possess the clarity that a 
meaningful peace initiative would necessitate. Indeed, the Hotline’s use in this first 
message remains an enigma unless it was, as a revisionist view would suggest, a pre-
planned initiative to mask other intentions rather than a response to an American action. 
The tone of the message contained none of the urgency that an emergency 
situation would have warranted. Kosygin’s inaugural Hotline message did not refer to 
any possible misunderstanding between the two parties; nor did it supply crucial 
information that the United States should have been made aware of. In fact, there was 
nothing in Kosygin’s message that would have been too late had it been transmitted 
with a few hours’ delay through regular diplomatic channels. Furthermore, the 
vagueness of the message causes us to question the extent to which the Soviet Union 
was ready to work for peace, especially in the short term. Unlike the first American 
message from Rusk to Gromyko after the outbreak of the Six-Day War,51 which had 
suggested concrete steps to be taken, Kosygin’s missive contained only a general desire 
to end the military conflict and a hint that peace should result from American pressure 
on Israel. It contained no specific references to any role the Soviet Union might intend 
to play in achieving peace.52 
The Soviet public statement, which was issued on the evening of 5 June and 
used much stronger language, supported the more revisionist interpretation. The 
statement repeated the general Soviet commitment to peace, and contained the first 
Soviet reference to the United Nations, demanding that the UN should condemn Israel 
and take the necessary steps to restore peace. As in the case of Kosygin’s Hotline 
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message, this public address failed to specify the Soviet role in the peace process or to 
invoke a spirit of cooperation. Instead, the statement repeated Kosygin’s subtle threat of 
independent Soviet action if necessary.53 This was in stark contrast with Rusk’s 
telegram to Gromyko and Johnson’s reply to Kosygin via the Hotline on the same day, 
both of which were constructive and suggested that a solution be sought through 
negotiations in the UNSC.54 
Several other factors point to the conclusion that Soviet use of the Hotline on 5 
June represented a step already calculated, and the Politburo, which convened at noon 
on 5 June for an emergency session, only approved a pre-existing plan. Perhaps, as 
revisionists argue, this use was part of a larger ploy to buy time for the Arab states who, 
the Politburo believed, could win the war only if it was allowed to be fought to a 
conclusion.55 Kosygin had personally checked the Hotline machine and asked about its 
operational details before the eruption of the war, saying that the line might be needed 
soon.56 Additionally, the Soviets had received detailed intelligence about the projected 
start of the war,57 which would have made the preparation of a message in advance 
possible. Drafting written documents some time before their promulgation was common 
practice in Moscow: for example, the Soviet public statement intended for 23 May 1967 
had been drafted and distributed several days ahead of time.58 Moreover, government-
controlled Soviet media also broadcast reports on 5 June that we know had been written 
before the fighting began.59 Finally, there is evidence that at first Ambassador 
Fedorenko received no new instructions after the outbreak of the war; and later, during 
the night of 5-6 June, the new instructions he did receive from Moscow had a wait-and-
see tone and did not substantially differ from previous instructions.60 Taken together, 
the above evidence suggests that Moscow was playing for time and, accordingly, that 
the Hotline message was intended as a diversion. 
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The pre-drafting of Kosygin’s Hotline message would explain what we now see 
as its historical inconsistencies, and a lack of urgency in its language which was in sharp 
contrast with both the behaviour of some of the Soviet leadership and the battlefield 
misfortunes of Soviet allies.61 Despite the general battle fog,62 the Politburo, at the very 
least, must have been aware of the earliest developments by 15:45, when the Hotline 
message was sent. At 10:15, the Soviet embassy in Cairo certainly knew that the 
Egyptian Air Force and the largest Egyptian air base had been destroyed.63 Moreover, 
the fact that the later Hotline message only referred to the fighting between Israel and 
Egypt (even though Syria – the apple of Moscow’s eye – and Jordan had also been 
involved, and heavily outgunned, in the fighting for hours by the time the message was 
sent) also points toward the conclusion that the message was drafted before the war 
started.64 
Furthermore, Soviet first contact over the Hotline was an independent initiative, 
not triggered by Rusk’s letter to Gromyko earlier in the day, which serves as additional 
evidence for the message being pre-planned.65 First, Kosygin’s Hotline message of 5 
June failed to acknowledge or reflect in any way the content of the lower-level 
American communication. Second, the American Embassy in Moscow received the 
cable with Rusk’s message at 13:25. The trio of Kosygin, Gromyko, and KGB chief 
Yuri Andropov left the Politburo session at 14:00 to proceed to the Hotline equipment 
in the basement of the new government communication centre.66 This would not have 
left enough time for U.S. Chargé John Guthrie to relay Rusk’s message to the Soviets 
and for the Politburo to draft a reply. It is unclear whether Guthrie delivered the 
message before or after the first Soviet Hotline message was sent at 15:45; but even if 
Guthrie met Gromyko before 15:45, the American missive had no effect on the Soviet 
position. At their meeting, Gromyko used the same language as the Hotline message 
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and did not respond to Rusk’s proposal to work through the UN67 – which also suggests 
a pre-planned and concerted effort on the Soviet side. 
Fumbling for Peace (6 June) 
It is changes in their behaviour from 6 June onward that seem to suggest an interest in 
peace by the Soviets and an intention to use the Hotline with the objective that 
traditionalists have attributed to them. However, the Hotline could only partially fulfil 
its role in alleviating tensions (or stopping the war), because Soviet responsiveness was 
seriously hindered by time difference, possible misunderstandings between the Foreign 
Ministry in Moscow and diplomats in New York and, more importantly, the inability of 
Soviet diplomatic communication to match the Hotline in speed.68 
Once again, it was Premier Kosygin who contacted President Johnson on the 
Hotline. However, this time his message clearly conveyed a sense of alarm and the sort 
of unmistakable negotiating position that could justify the traditionalist perspective. The 
Soviet message was curt, even taking into account the directness of the Russian 
language. Kosygin started his text with expressing his apprehension that ‘military 
activities in the near east continue, moreover their scope is spreading’.69 Then he 
accepted the UNSC as the place for negotiations and clearly stated the Soviet conditions 
for peace: immediate cease-fire and withdrawal behind the armistice lines. However, the 
brisk tone and timing of this 6 June message caution against a wholeheartedly 
traditionalist interpretation. Although the message was not sent until 13:34 (Moscow 
time), it reached President Johnson at dawn (EST), inconveniencing the President more 
than Kosygin’s 5 June Hotline message, which had been sent two hours later in the day. 
Unfortunately, Kosygin’s Hotline message and Johnson’s rather agitated reply 
five hours later, in which he vented his frustration, were not helpful in facilitating 
negotiations. The President expressed ‘disappointment that the UN Security Council 
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lost a full day yesterday’ and he ‘was puzzled […] by what has been said in the Soviet 
press’, for ‘it does not help to charge the United States as a participant in aggression.’70 
Finally, he made it clear that free passage through the Strait of Tiran was crucial for the 
United States. Thus the Johnson-Kosygin exchange on 6 June only echoed the 
negotiating impasse that Ambassadors Nicolai Fedorenko and Arthur Goldberg had 
arrived at in New York five hours earlier.71 
The seemingly heavy-handed Soviet approach was rooted in a time difference 
between the two powers that did not favour the USSR, and in the slow workings of the 
Soviet diplomatic corps. The decision about the contents of Kosygin’s letter had been 
made during the previous night, presumably at the Politburo session that had ended at 3 
am.72 Indeed, when American Chargé Guthrie met Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister 
Vasili Kuznetsov at noon on 6 June – an hour and a half before Kosygin’s message was 
actually transmitted – Kuznetsov referred to Kosygin’s message to support a cease-fire 
and withdrawal formula as if the message had already been sent ‘last night’, that is the 
night of 5 June.73 When the impasse became clear in New York at around 22:00 (EST) 
on 5 June, Ambassador Fedorenko requested a break to consult with his government. 
However, it was already past 6 a.m. (6 June) in Moscow; the decision about the content 
of Kosygin’s message had already been made; and the Politburo had already retired.74 
Nonetheless, ten hours passed between the Politburo decision and the sending of 
Kosygin’s message, which seems inexplicable75 if we do not allow for the Politburo’s 
inflexibility and the ponderous nature of the Soviet government machinery in general. It 
may also indicate a misunderstanding between Fedorenko and top decision-makers in 
Moscow,76 which would reinforce traditionalist arguments that attribute inconsistencies 
in Soviet behaviour to mistakes.  
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In addition, Johnson’s reply reached Moscow too late (at 18:43) to make any 
difference in the Soviet negotiating position in the UN, as Ambassadors Goldberg and 
Fedorenko had been meeting since 18:00 (10:00 EST). Thus, it was Goldberg who 
relayed the contents of Johnson’s reply to Fedorenko. The Soviet side could only 
meaningfully negotiate at the UN on the afternoon of 6 June, after urgency prompted 
Moscow to ignore some security precautions in its communications with the Soviet 
mission in New York. Around the same time (or shortly afterwards) Johnson’s reply to 
Kosygin’s message was received, and in an ‘extraordinary occurrence’, Deputy Foreign 
Minister Vladimir Semyonov called New York on an open line to say that new 
instructions were being drafted and a meeting with Goldberg should be arranged 
immediately after receiving them.77 These new orders, signed by Gromyko, directed 
Fedorenko to accept Goldberg’s offer of a cease-fire and withdrawal behind the 18 May 
1967 borders or, if this was not possible, to agree to a simple cease-fire resolution even 
in the face of Arab opposition.78 After a short negotiation, the parties agreed to a simple 
cease-fire resolution and promised that that the idea of withdrawal would be explored 
further. Fedorenko confirmed Moscow’s approval of the draft at 17:15 EST (1:15 on 7 
June in Moscow).79  
Somewhat extraordinarily, 45 minutes later, Kosygin also contacted Johnson on 
the Hotline to inform him, curtly, of Soviet acceptance of the agreement. This was well 
into the night in Moscow; and while transmitting mutually beneficial information would 
have been an exemplary use of the Hotline, Kosygin only told the President what he 
already knew.80 We can only speculate as to why Kosygin found it important to bring in 
the Hotline and send this seemingly redundant message. One possible explanation is 
that he may have mistakenly projected his own communication problems onto the 
American side. Another is that he intended to emphasise the importance that the Soviet 
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side attached to the agreement. Both of these alternative explanations support 
traditionalist expectations of the Hotline’s use, but they involve different functions of 
the device. The former exemplifies the Hotline’s information-sharing role, while the 
latter embodies its symbolic value as a channel of good will and dialogue in times of 
danger.  
Soviet reaction to Johnson’s sharply-worded Hotline response, which Moscow 
received around noon, not only demonstrates a nearly immaculate textbook use of the 
Hotline, but also played a decidedly more constructive role in lessening tensions. In his 
reply to Kosygin’s first message of 6 June, the President, in addition to setting out the 
American negotiating position, repeated complaints that the United States had already 
conveyed through regular diplomatic channels to little effect. President Johnson 
objected to Soviet media reports about American participation in the war. Knowing that 
the Sixth Fleet was deliberately being kept far from the war zone in order to avoid its 
getting drawn into the war, Johnson point blank suggested that Kosygin should check 
his facts since ‘you know where our carriers are’.81 While Kuznetsov had already told 
Guthrie that not everything that appeared in Izvestija was the official position of the 
Soviet government,82 Johnson’s complaint, delivered via the Hotline, was taken more 
seriously in Moscow. Even though Kosygin personally never believed Nasser’s 
accusations of American participation in the war,83 an enquiry was launched among 
Soviet ships in the Mediterranean as to whether American planes had participated in the 
fighting against Egypt. The answer was negative, confirming the American side of the 
story, and the charges disappeared from Soviet media thereafter.84 
Kosygin’s move would have been more constructive had he also used the 
Hotline to inform his American counterpart of the results of this enquiry, thereby 
removing the Americans’ uncertainty about Soviet beliefs in this regard, although at the 
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same time giving up a small bargaining advantage in an otherwise unfavourable 
situation. However, given the Soviet leadership’s failure to disown these beliefs, the 
Americans continued to exert considerable effort to counter accusations of participation, 
both in the UN and through the American Embassy in Moscow.85 The issue also 
remained an item in the Kosygin-Johnson Hotline correspondence: President Johnson 
returned to the subject on 7 June, pointing out the damage the accusations had caused. 
‘The wholly false reports and invented charges’, he wrote, ‘resulted in mob action 
against American embassies and a break in Diplomatic Relations by seven Arab 
countries’.86 
Textbook Use (7-9 June) 
Between 7 June and 9 June 1967, Soviet leaders may still have privately entertained the 
idea of military action.87 Nonetheless, in line with traditionalist expectations, they used 
the Hotline for its intended purpose: sharing information, preventing misunderstanding, 
and lessening tensions. Soviet-American dialogue continued at all levels – at the UN, in 
Washington and Moscow, and, of course, via the Hotline. The two leaders sent one 
Hotline message each on 7 June; and five messages were exchanged on 8 June. The 
Direct Communication Link remained silent on 9 June.  
While Ambassador Fedorenko at the UN took the initiatives necessary to end 
hostilities, refine cease-fire conditions and achieve a withdrawal resolution,88 Kosygin’s 
Hotline messages served a different purpose: to convey Soviet thinking. Premier 
Kosygin’s message of 7 June kept President Johnson informed about the Soviet position 
and expressed a desire to ‘take effective measures’ toward peace.89 To this end, as 
Kosygin wrote in a more sharply worded Hotline message, the Soviet Union had 
requested that the UNSC reconvene on 8 June. This request most likely reflected Soviet 
dismay at advances made on the battlefield by Israel and the latter’s failure to comply 
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with the terms of the cease-fire that had been agreed. Kosygin’s message voiced Soviet 
intentions to work not only for a cease-fire but also for withdrawal. In response, the 
Americans shared with their Soviet counterparts what they knew and pointed to missing 
information with regard to compliance with the cease-fire.90  
Cooperative behaviour was most evident on 8 June in connection with the 
sinking of the USS Liberty in the Mediterranean. Premier Kosygin first learned of the 
incident via the Hotline after President Johnson initiated a Hotline conversation for the 
first time.91 This American move, supplemented with parallel efforts to inform the 
Soviet side through embassies in Washington and Moscow, impressed the Soviet 
leadership.92 They reciprocated American good will by voluntarily transmitting the 
information received via the Hotline to Egypt. Moreover, this time Kosygin also 
informed Johnson of Soviet actions in this regard.93  
Nonetheless, and contrary to the intent of the Hotline’s creation, the largely 
cooperative spirit of 7-9 June was punctuated by distrust and competition. Neither 
Kosygin nor Johnson missed an opportunity to blame the other’s allies, or to imply that 
the other superpower should work harder for peace.94 Similarly, in the UN, Fedorenko 
outmanoeuvred Goldberg by introducing the 7 June resolution to set a deadline for a 
cease-fire without the customary bilateral consultations, and only apologised the next 
day in the face of American protest.95 
Going for Broke (10 June) 
On 10 June, Kosygin proved again that the DCL was not above common diplomatic 
tactics when he issued an ultimatum, further aggravating superpower relations and 
increasing the chances of (accidental) confrontations between Moscow and 
Washington.96 This use of the Hotline fits with revisionist interpretations. Regardless of 
whether the Soviet ultimatum was intended as a first step toward (limited) intervention 
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or as a desperate gamble to protect Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, the high-risk strategy 
exacerbated the situation instead of lessening tensions. While the Soviet gamble paid 
off, saving Soviet allies from further destruction and humiliation and resulting in the 
end of fighting, this outcome was primarily the result of level-headed reaction by 
American decision-makers. 
All things considered, Kosygin’s ultimatum was not entirely surprising. First, 
the Soviet position had already begun hardening the evening before. On the evening of 
9 June, the Soviets made a public statement that ‘the Socialist states would do 
everything necessary to help the Arab countries if Israel did not withdraw from the 
gained territories’.97 The USSR was effectively issuing a veiled threat. Second, Soviet 
behaviour had also hardened before Kosygin’s Hotline message: two hours earlier the 
Soviet Union had broken off diplomatic relations with Israel.98 Not only was Kosygin’s 
first Hotline message of 10 June in stark contrast to the cordial language of his 
messages in connection with the Liberty incident two days earlier, but the sharpness of 
his words surpassed even that of the 9 June public statement, and expressed a position 
that accords with the revisionist interpretation. In a message that revealed urgency, he 
talked of ‘a very crucial moment that has now arrived’, which in the absence of the 
cessation of hostilities would ‘force us […] to adopt an independent decision’ that 
threatened to bring the superpowers ‘into a clash, which may lead to a grave 
catastrophe’. He finished his message with a direct and not necessarily empty threat: if 
the U.S. failed to make Israel honour the ceasefire agreement, Kosygin wrote, the Soviet 
Union would take all necessary actions, ‘including military’.99  
The change in Soviet behaviour which was reflected in the tone and content of 
Kosygin’s message arose from intense arguments within the Soviet leadership about 
how best to defend Syria from Israeli invasion.100 This message was followed up with 
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lower level inquiries, with KGB officer Sedov being instructed to informally sound out 
Deputy Undersecretary Garthoff about the possible consequences of Soviet intervention. 
In the event, a lunch meeting between Sedov and Garthoff happened too late to make a 
difference to the unfolding of developments;101 but this incident reveals a troubling 
aspect of Hotline diplomacy. The speed of the Hotline deprives decision-makers of 
information collected through slower channels which may make a valuable input into 
their decisions. Had the Kosygin-Johnson exchange turned sour in the morning, Sedov’s 
information about American resolve in the event of Soviet intervention would have 
come too late to make a difference and dampen tempers on the Soviet side. 
Nonetheless, Kosygin’s message did not irrevocably commit the Soviets to a 
military solution. Rather, it left the door open for cooperation, as evidenced by the fact 
that he finished his message by asking for Johnson’s views. This helped maintain a 
dialogue with the United States and resulted in the frantic exchange of six Hotline 
messages in little more than three hours.102 Although the correspondence was quite 
brusque, the U.S. issued no counter threats.103 Instead, the American messages 
attempted to pacify Moscow by revealing that Israel had already accepted the cease-fire, 
was about to stop fighting, and had no intention of occupying Damascus. The latter was 
a worrying possibility that had arisen from the Israeli invasion of the Golan Heights on 
9 June, and which Kosygin had referred to explicitly in his second message of 10 
June.104 Finally, Kosygin strengthened the atmosphere of cooperation when he 
responded positively to an American request for help in reaching Syria,105 where the 
United States no longer had an embassy. After an additional American appeal in which 
Johnson asked him to verbally ‘confirm that you have employed your means with the 
Syrians’,106 Kosygin assured the President via the Hotline that ‘on my instructions, we 
have just communicated with Damascus’.107 
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As military action wound down and tensions eased, the superpowers worked to 
re-establish the original purpose of the Hotline as a forum for cooperative 
communication. In their final messages, both Kosygin and Johnson struck a more 
friendly tone and expressed a desire for post-war cooperation. In contrast to the 
vagueness of the 5 June Soviet message, this time Kosygin’s message also outlined the 
details of the Soviet negotiating position for a post-war settlement: Israeli evacuation of 
the occupied territories and the warring parties’ return behind the pre-war border.108 
However, with the conclusion of the acute phase of the crisis, and in accordance with 
what would be traditionalist expectations with regard to the Hotline’s use, it was to be 
four years before the Moscow-Washington Hotline was once again employed–at the 
start of another international crisis. Instead, Soviet-American dialogue in general, and, 
in particular, negotiations over UNSC Resolution 242 establishing the principles meant 
to guide future negotiations for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, continued 
through lower-level diplomatic channels. 
Conclusion 
We can only partially substantiate President Johnson’s claim that the MOLINK was 
used to ‘alleviate tensions’ in the Six-Day War. The Soviet Union did not use the 
Hotline before 5 June, when it would have been prudent to do so; and it then used the 
device between 5 and 10 June for a variety of purposes that fit the interpretations of 
both the traditionalists and the revisionists. The Hotline gave Moscow the means to 
transmit important information to their American counterparts, to obscure Soviet 
intentions, to gain time, to express negotiating positions, to assign responsibility, and to 
threaten military intervention. Soviet leaders sometimes used one message for several 
purposes, thus providing evidence for both traditionalist and revisionist interpretations. 
Nonetheless, most Soviet Hotline messages predominantly support either a traditionalist 
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interpretation, such as the Soviet response to American messages with regard to the 
sinking of the Liberty on 8 June, or a revisionist interpretation, such as Kosygin’s 5 June 
message. It is important to note that, contrary to our original expectations, uses of the 
Hotline that fit a traditionalist or a revisionist interpretation do not correspond perfectly 
to histories of the Soviet role in the Six-Day War as written from a traditionalist or a 
revisionist point of view. Kosygin’s Hotline ultimatum of 10 June was reckless, and 
therefore supports a revisionist interpretation, regardless of whether the Soviet threat 
was empty or real. This also suggests that it may be more important to study the 
implications of Soviet behaviour than to decipher Soviet intentions, about which it is 
difficult to say anything conclusive in the absence of available and reliable Soviet 
archival material. 
Overall, evidence discussed in this article leads to the conclusion that, in the 
June War of 1967, Moscow viewed the Hotline as one of many diplomatic means it 
could choose from and did not assign it any special significance. This interpretation is 
supported by Premier Kosygin’s rejection of President Johnson’s suggestion of yearly 
summits in Glassboro: he rejected the idea on the grounds that Johnson could use the 
Hotline whenever he wanted to talk to him – and not just in crises.109 Even such a 
temporary devaluation of the Hotline is troubling, because it undermines the device’s 
symbolic value as a top-level channel of good will in emergencies. This renders the 
contribution of the Hotline questionable once its other advantage, speed, is lost due to 
technological developments. In time, communication within both superpowers’ 
diplomatic corps would match the speed of the Hotline. Perhaps Kosygin and Johnson 
intuitively grasped this problem when they attempted to restore the value of the Hotline 
through more friendly exchanges as the crisis was winding down on 10 June.  
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Nevertheless, at the time of the Six-Day War, communication between Moscow 
and its New York mission still lagged considerably behind events. In fact, 
miscommunication between Moscow and New York on 6 June suggests that equally 
swift communication within states’ diplomatic corps is essential if the advantages of 
fast-spaced communication between heads of state are to be reaped. This is particularly 
problematic for political systems that do not, as the Soviet one did not, reward or 
encourage individual initiative – a quality that could compensate for the inadequate 
speed of diplomatic communication. 
Recourse to communication through the DCL also raises several additional 
concerns about the practicality of the Hotline as a diplomatic tool. First, the Soviet 
Union had to grapple with the disadvantages of geographic distance and time difference. 
Second, as the Sedov-Garthoff lunch on 10 June demonstrates, some traditional but 
usually fruitful techniques of information gathering can never match the speed of 
hotlines, and this may rob decision-makers of vital information. Fast-spaced 
communication through the MOLINK is problematic not only for the superpowers, but 
also for their allies, because speedy discussions between the former may deny the latter 
a right to consultation and consent over matters that directly concern their fate. Finally, 
hotlines remain inadequate channels for direct negotiations. Instantaneous heads-of-
state exchanges are a cumbersome negotiating method as long as they take the form of 
written communication. Using telephone capabilities and the video link that the Hotline 
is now equipped with would solve this issue, but it would raise other issues such as the 
problem of deniability and the danger of miscommunication. Thus, as the Fedorenko 
and Goldberg negotiations at the UN in 1967 demonstrate, an additional – less high-
profile – negotiating channel remains necessary.  
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Table 1. Direct bilateral contacts between Washington and Moscow during the Middle 
East crisis of 1967 (12 May 1967 – 10 June 1967)* 
Date From To Type Diplomatic Channel 
18 May Rostow Chernyakov Meeting Regular (Washington) 
19 May Thompson Dobrynin Meeting Regular (Moscow) Goldberg Fedorenko Meeting Regular (United Nations) 
22 May Johnson Kosygin Letter Regular 
23 May Thompson Gromyko Letter Regular (Moscow) Goldberg Fedorenko Meeting Regular (United Nations) 
24 May Garthoff  Sedov (KGB) Meeting Informal (Washington) Goldberg Fedorenko Meeting Regular (United Nations) 
27 May Chernyakov Rusk Phone call Regular (Washington) Kosygin Johnson Letter Regular 
28 May  Johnson Kosygin Letter Regular Rusk Gromyko Letter Regular 
31 May Fedorenko  Goldberg Meeting Regular (United Nations) 
3 June Fedorenko  Goldberg Meeting Regular (United Nations) 
5 June 
Rusk* Gromyko Letter Regular 
Kosygin Johnson Letter Hotline 
Rusk* Gromyko Letter Hotline 
Johnson Kosygin Letter Hotline 
Chernyakov Meeker Meeting** Regular (Washington) 
Goldberg Fedorenko Meeting† Regular (United Nations) 
Goldberg Fedorenko Meeting† Regular (United Nations) 
6 June 
Gutherie Kuznetsov Meeting Regular (Moscow) 
Kosygin Johnson Letter Hotline 
Johnson Kosygin Letter Hotline 
Goldberg Fedorenko Meeting Regular (United Nations) 
Goldberg Fedorenko Meeting Regular (United Nations) 
Goldberg Fedorenko Meeting Regular (United Nations) 
Kosygin Johnson Letter Hotline 
Johnson Kosygin Letter Hotline 
7 June Kosygin Johnson Letter Hotline Johnson Kosygin Letter Hotline 
8 June 
Kosygin Johnson Letter Hotline 
Rusk†† Chernyakov Phone call Regular (Washington) 
Rusk†† Chernyakov Phone call Regular (Washington) 
U.S. Embassy 
representative 
Foreign Ministry 
official ? Regular (Moscow) 
Johnson Kosygin Letter Hotline 
Johnson Kosygin Letter Hotline 
Kosygin Johnson Letter Hotline 
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Date From To Type Diplomatic Channel 
Kohler†† Chernyakov Phone call Regular (Washington) 
Fedorenko Goldberg Meeting Regular (United Nations) 
Johnson Kosygin Letter Hotline 
Rusk Kalugin (KGB) Meeting Regular (Washington) 
9 June Guthrie Fedoseev Phone call Moscow 
10 June 
Kosygin Johnson Letter Hotline 
Johnson Kosygin Letter Hotline 
Kosygin Johnson Letter Hotline 
Johnson Kosygin Letter Hotline 
Kosygin Johnson Letter Hotline 
Johnson Kosygin Letter Hotline 
Sedov (KGB) Garthoff Meeting Informal (Washington) 
*same message sent via two channels 
** the meeting was about the Outer Space Treaty 
† multiple meetings on the same day; the exact number of meetings on 5 June is 
uncertain 
†† Records in the LBJ Library indicate two calls from Rusk and one from Kohler. Cf. 
‘Chronology’ [1967] which indicates two calls by Kohler and none by Rusk. 
Source: LBJ Library holdings; FRUS 2004; Ginor and Remez 2007; ‘Chronology’ 1967 
